European roaming markets - why are international roaming tariffs high? by Katramo, Mikko Ilmari
Helsingin yliopisto - Helsingfors universitet - University of Helsinki ID 2005-123
Tiedekunta-Fakultet-Faculty
Faculty of Social Sciences
Laitos-Institution-Department
Department of Economics
Tekijä-Författare-Author
Katramo, Mikko Ilmari
Työn nimi-Arbetets titel-Title
European roaming markets - why are international roaming tariffs high?
Oppiaine-Läroämne-Subject
Economics
Työn laji-Arbetets art-Level
Master's thesis
Aika-Datum-Month and year
2005-11-09
Sivumäärä-Sidantal-Number of pages
87
Tiivistelmä-Referat-Abstract
This paper studies international roaming markets in Europe. The object of this paper is to conclude, why international roaming prices are very
high. The main question is whether the prices are high because of collusion or because of some other reasons. I approach this question by
modeling different factors that might raise prices. I use the following three articles in modeling: Shy (2001), Kultti and Leppämäki (2004) and
Salsas and Koboldt (2003). Other important references of this paper are: Economides (1996) and Laffond and Tirole (2000).I also study if
collusion can be equilibrium in international roaming markets and distinguish different factors that favor collusion. In addition I use the related
industrial organization, access pricing and network economics theories in my analysis.
In chapter four I discuss that self-sustaining collusion can work for MNOs in international roaming and is more consistent with reality than the
fully competitive example. In addition, I distinguish many factors that favor collusion in international roaming markets. I also reason that a
collusive strategy across and inside country borders can be equilibrium.
On the other hand, I show that inter operator tariffs (IOTs) can be high in competitive markets yet because of imperfect traffic direction systems.
Bulk discount are used aside with traffic direction. Modeling bulk discounts prevails that bulk discounts probably increase the usage of roaming
services. It is not clear how they affect to prices. In addition I reason that consumer behavior and negotiations rules have features that mute
competition and thus probably raise prices. Modeling alliances prevails that it is probable that alliances increase wholesale prices. This reflects to
retail prices as well. In addition the prices that alliance MNOs apply are probable higher than what non alliance members apply. Even though
international roaming markets have many features that might raise prices I come to the conclusion that mobile network operators are engaged in
tacit collusion in Europe.
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